Using a multilevel, longitudinal model, we tested the mugging thesis, which states that 'a conservative is a liberal who has been mugged', in a national sample of Italians (N = 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 their own self-worth. Criminal victimisation, since it is based on the perpetrator's intention to cause harm (Craig-Henderson & Sloan, 2003) , is likely to jeopardise such assumptions. Hence, beyond its undesirable physical and economic (Van Dorn, 2004) consequences, victimisation may have negative psychological outcomes, fostering victims' senses of menace and psychological distress (Norris & Kaniasty, 1994) and lowering their levels of well-being (Denkers & Winkel, 1998) . Thus, it is not surprising that people try to understand victimisation experiences and actively neutralise their negative effects through strategies such as denial of psychological and physical injury, acceptance of responsibility or appeal to higher motives (Warner & Branscombe, 2011; Winkel, 1998) .
The rationale behind the mugging thesis mainly relies on the simple assumption that people who are aware of the dangers of crime through first-hand experience (i. e., direct victimisation) tend to support policies hinged on law and order that are typically proposed by right-wing (conservative) parties (Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997) . This is because they believe those policies will mitigate crime. This idea resonates with the social psychological view of conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Thorisdottir & Jost, 2011) . These authors argue that fear and threats can trigger the expression of conservative tendencies as people attempt to manage anxiety-inducing thoughts (Jost et al., 2003) . In this light, conservatism should be considered, at least in part, as an ideological buffer that people may use to cope with environmental menace. Consistent with this idea, Napier and Jost (2008) showed that conservatives are systematically happier than liberals, plausibly because they are less exposed to the deleterious effects of rumination and introspection or because they are more able to rationalise the status quo. Following this line of reasoning, it is plausible that people might enhance their degree of conservatism to manage environmental uncertainty and threats from having been victimised.
Moreover, this would be consistent with ideas from the literature on the compensatory control mechanism (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Mirisola, Roccato, Russo, Spagna, & Vieno, in press ). According to this perspective, people can cope with the existential threat that comes from having low levels of perceived control over their environment (a typical consequence of criminal victimisation: see Jackson, 2011) by endorsing external systems that impose structure and order within their social worlds, including political forces that support the status quo. However, at present there is no solid evidence in favour of the mugging thesis. For example, Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen (1980) showed that a composed index that integrated victimisation and fear of crime explained only 1% of the support for law-and-order policies.
Moreover, Langworthy and Whitehead (1986) , Stack (2000) , and Unnever, Cullen and Fisher (2007) did not find any significant links between victimisation and participants' conservatism.
Analogous results stemmed from research on the links between victimisation and punitiveness (Evans & Adams, 2003; King & Maruna, 2009; Stack, 2003) . These studies looked only for direct effects (or for non-theoretically based interactive effects, see Unnever et al., 2007) .
However, victimisation can have interactive effects on social psychological outcomes. Indeed, it has recently been shown that victimisation fosters fear of crime only among people living in disadvantaged areas, in terms of perceived disorder-a variable strongly related to crime spread (Roccato, Russo, & Vieno, 2011 )-and unemployment rates (Vieno, Russo, & Roccato, 2011 .
Thus, two different forms of community disadvantage have been shown to moderate the relationship between criminal victimisation and the fear of crime.
On the one hand, the moderating effect of perceived disorder has been discussed with regard to victimisation as an incentive for people to focus on the material and symbolic ecological cues of the environment in which they live. This makes the negative contextual aspects of their communities salient (Schultz & Tabanico, 2009 This argument is line with traditional criminological research (e. g., Bennett, DiIulio, & Walters, 1996; Lupton & Tulloch, 1999) , which argues that psychological reactions to crime are substantially rational consequences from directly experiencing criminality. In this light, increased concern about crime following victimisation experiences should lead people with higher risks of being victimised again-i. e., those living in areas with high crime rates-to desire more law-and-order politics, and this would push them towards the right side of the political spectrum (Page & Shapiro, 1992) .
On the other hand, the moderating effect of the unemployment rate for a given area-considered synonymous with local socioeconomic disadvantage (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009 )-is in line with a blend of traditional and critical criminologists' arguments. According to this view, social psychological reactions to crime following victimisation are the consequences of social and economic disadvantage (Mathieu, 1995) . People feel vulnerable to events beyond their control, including crime (Franklin, Franklin, & Fearn, 2008; Greenberg & Paulsen, 1996; Roman & Chaflin, 2008) , and therefore are less able to cope with negative life events and less protected against many social anxieties, including those stemming from criminality (Hummelsheim, Hirtenehner, Jackson, & Oberwittler, 2011) . This perspective argues that living in a socioeconomically disadvantaged community should exacerbate the consequences of criminal victimisation experiences both because it enhances subjective vulnerability and anxiety and because it prevents crime victims from successfully coping with the negative events they have experienced. In this light, increased concern about crime after criminal victimisation should lead people who are particularly vulnerable to economic anxieties-those living in areas with a 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Blakely & Woodward, 2000; Diez-Roux, 1998; Lee, 2000) . Indeed, by taking a multilevel approach, it is possible to disentangle the effects exerted on individual outcomes by the context from those stemming from individual variables, and to analyse the cross-level interactions between individual and contextual variables. Thus, multilevel models are particularly appropriate for research designs where, as in this case, the data for participants are nested (organized at more than one level). 
Goals and Hypotheses
We performed a multilevel longitudinal study of the mugging thesis, testing two hypotheses. If, consistently with the traditional approach to social psychological reactions to crime, victimised people tend to be particularly sensitive to surrounding signs of possible new victimisation, the strength of the relationship between victimisation and conservatism should increase over time as a function of the crime rate in those participants' communities (HP1). If, consistently with a blend of the critical and traditional approaches, victimised people tend to be particularly sensitive to economic vulnerability, the strength of the relationship between victimisation and conservatism should increase over time as a function of the unemployment rate in those participants' communities (HP2). we considered the mean position given by the most politically expert participants of the ITANES sample as the parties' 'inter-subjective' positions. 2 Table 1 presents the positions for the parties we considered. The higher the party's score, the higher its degree of conservatism. For our dependent variable, we used the change in the degree of conservatism for participants' voting intentions over time. Participants who did not express any voting intentions were excluded from the analyses.
Method Design

Predictors
We used predictors at three different levels. At the within-individual level, we created a dummy variable for each wave to assess victimisation experiences: 0 = participants who had not gender (0 = men, 1 = women), age, years of formal education, socio-economic status (SES) and the size of participants' areas of residence. Based on Corbetta, Cavazza, and Roccato (2009), we measured SES using four dummies expressing participants' social class-bourgeoisie, white-collar, self-employed and blue-collar workers-and used unemployed people as reference category. For residency data, we used a dummy variable (coding 0 people living in towns with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and 1 people living in larger towns).
At the ecological level, we used two variables gathered from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT: www.istat.it) website and measured at the county level: (a) the official crime rate as the ratio between the entire number of crimes reported to police and the number of people living in each county; and (b) the unemployment rate as the number of unemployed residents within each county's population. The focus of our analysis was on the two cross-level interactions between criminal victimisation on the one hand and county crime and unemployment rates on the other.
Analytic Strategy
We ran a three-level hierarchical regression model using Hierarchical Linear Modeling software (HLM, Raudenbush, & Bryk, 2002) . The within-individual influence exerted on conservatism over time by direct victimisation was modelled at Level 1: Between-individuals conservatism variations were modelled at Level 2. The intercepts at
Level 1 became the outcomes we tried to explain at Level 2:
Finally, at Level 3, the variability of victimisation's effect was modelled as a function of the crime rate and of the unemployment rate after entering the principal effects of those variables (expressed at the third level as the effects they exerted on the variability of the intercepts-effects on β 00j ):
All the other parameters in the model were fixed. In order to clearly analyse the cross-level interactions, we used the simple slope technique as applicable (Bauer & Curran, 2005) .
Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables we used and the correlations among them. 3 As a whole, 11% of our sample participants had experienced victimisation. Table 3 ). Victimisation did not directly influence our dependent variable. However, since we found a significant random variance for the victimisation effect, χ 2 (44) = 79.01, p < .01, we felt justified in formally testing our HP1 and HP2.
Conservatism variations between individuals were modelled at Level 2 (see Model 2 in Table 3 ). Only age was connected to these variations: Conservatism was shown to increase over time among older people.
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The three last columns of Table 3 (Model 3) show that, consistently with HP2, the cross-level interaction between victimisation and the unemployment rate was positively and significantly related to changes in the level of conservatism. However, contrary to HP1, the cross-level interaction between the crime rate and victimisation did not reach statistical significance (p = .135). 
Discussion
In this study, we aimed to analyse how people's levels of conservatism changed based on the interaction between criminal victimisation and the degree of social disadvantage within the areas where participants lived. Generally speaking, we showed that criminal victimisation, beyond physical , economic (Van Dorn, 2004 ) and psychological (Denkers & Winkel, 1998; Koss, Woodruff, & Koss, 1990; Norris & Kaniasty, 1994; Resnik, 1987) consequences, may have relevant, enduring political effects. Consistently with previous research we found no main effect from victimisation on our dependent variable (Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Sears et al., 1980; Stack, 2000; Unnever et al., 2007) . Moreover, unlike what we expected in our HP1, we did not find a significant effect for the cross-level interaction between victimisation and the crime rates in participant counties. However, consistently with HP2, the cross-level interaction between victimisation and unemployment rates did foster participants' conservatism over time. Criminal victimisation led people living in counties with high unemployment rates to shift their voting intentions towards more conservative political parties, while no effect was found among people living in counties with low unemployment rates.
Thus, even though the literature lacks solid results in favour of the mugging thesis (King & Maruna, 2009; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Sears et al., 1980; Stack, 2000) , our results
showed that the analysis of cross-level interaction effects among predictors may help to discover multilevel longitudinal links between victimisation experiences and conservatism. Indeed, Five main conclusions may be drawn from this study. The first two concern the social psychology of conservatism, two more make reference to other domains, and the last covers research performed in social psychology outside this domain. Second, the literature on terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Stone, 2001 ) is somewhat inconsistent regarding the political effects of anxiety. On the one hand, according to some researchers, people can successfully cope with threats stemming from anxiety by adhering to values and views that dominate their society, i. e., raising their conventionalism (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2001; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) . This is a construct strictly linked with conservatism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950 (2001) showed victimisation influencing people's conservatism through the fear of new victimisation and anger towards society for its inability to protect them. These studies did not account for any moderated effects, while we could not account for any mediators.
Future multilevel research explaining the conditional link between victimisation experiences and conservatism by addressing and comparing the roles played by the fear of crime, resentment towards society and closed-mindedness as mediating variables would be germane.
Third, our results allowed us to participate in the debate about the nature of psychological reactions to crime, a dispute characterised by two main ideas. According to researchers taking a classic criminological approach (e. g., Lupton & Tulloch, 1999) , psychological reactions to crime are quasi-rational consequences of people's experiences with criminality. However, according to critical researchers (Franklin, Franklin, & Fearn, 2008; Roman & Chaflin, 2008;  Vieno, Nation, Perkins, Pastore, & Santinello, 2010; Vieno, Roccato, & Russo, in press), such reactions primarily depend on people's social and economic vulnerability, in that concern for their neighbourhood's economic condition makes people feel vulnerable to events beyond their control, including crime (Greenberg & Paulsen, 1996) . Following this line of reasoning, decay, optimism and foreboding in the neighbourhoods, towns, cities, and wider political communities in which they live and move' (Hope & Sparks, 2000, p. 5) . Our findings showed that victimisation experiences might influence political conservatism only in areas characterised by high unemployment rates. Thus, our results support a blend of the traditional and the critical approaches to psychological reactions to crime by highlighting that synergy between experiences with criminality and social and economic insecurity seems to be necessary for an increase in conservative endorsements.
Fourth, in spite of their emotional and subjective dimensions, psychological reactions to crime, far from being exclusively private psychological experiences, proved to be at least partially historically and socially specific. According to personality psychologists Lavine, Lodge, Polichak and Taber (2002) , 'The political effects of personality do not occur in a contextual vacuum, but instead are magnified by the presence of key precipitating or 'activating' features of the political environment' (Lavine, et al., 2002, p. 344) . Consistent with this idea, Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson and Anderson (2010) more recently stated that 'variation in people's psychological predispositions leads them to respond differently when exposed to common environmental stimuli, and, correspondingly, that the expression of personality traits will vary by situation' (p. 90). Although framed as a social psychology approach, our results agreed with this claim. Future multilevel studies aimed at testing it for other research topics will be interesting.
The last implication of our study relates to research in social psychology, even that outside this field of study. According to Doise (1986) , social psychological phenomena can be explained Roccato, & Vieno, 2011, in press ). However, a replication of this research performed at the street-block or neighbourhood level would be interesting. Second, the low variability of the crime rates at county level impels us to look at the results carefully, in particular the non-interactive effect of this variable in predicting conservatism. Future cross-national studies might help to create a clearer picture of this connection.
Despite the limitations noted above, our study had some strong points, mainly its longitudinal, multilevel approach and the quality of the sample we used. Indeed, it added to previous research by Russo and colleagues (2012)-which, to our knowledge, was the first empirical confirmation of the mugging thesis available in the literature-in three ways. First, the longitudinal nature of the data we analysed allowed us to examine how individual and contextual features impact people's conservatism over time. Second, the use of multilevel models allowed us to simultaneously consider intra-and inter-individual variables, as well as environmental predictors of changes in conservatism. Third, and most important for the aim of this study, our McClelland, & Culhane, 1995) . In this study, we have shown that cross-level moderation analysis actually helped us to better explain the complex and enduring links between victimisation and political preferences, providing the first strong empirical confirmation of the mugging thesis. We believe our results should be considered useful starting points for new research on this topic. Castano, E., Leidner, B., Bonacossa, A., Nikkah, J., Perrulli, R., Spencer, B., & Humphrey, N. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
